Could have huge implications. Witkoff is Trump's envoy, he doesn't appeared to be plugged into the rest of the natsec team, and his remit is to "end the wars." ft.com/content/62e446…
Trump's aides have signaled that he wants to try talking before resorting to force--which fits with his focus on "ending the wars" of the Biden era, rather than starting new ones.
A very good point. Trump loves winners--Witkoff is also his personal friend, and naming him (rather than a natsec specialist) means he can exert personal control over the file.
Privately, DOD admits they have had limited success against the Houthis, despite strikes being larger than what was done under Biden, "and much bigger than what [DOD] has publicly described." Costs are $200 million so far and could exceed $1 billion by next week.
Deployments of B-2 bombers and additional assets have been connected to the US pressure campaign against Iran, but they also likely serve a role in freeing up more assets to use against the Houthis.
The campaign is big and getting bigger...though so far, with limited success.
Pushback suggests the admin sees additional stages in this campaign--perhaps more bombing (which would mean more munitions and more spending).
Note the private pushback did not include any mention of killing Houthi leaders, despite Gabbard and others claiming it publicly.
"A preventive attack likely won’t be a one-off but rather the opening round of a lengthy campaign employing military strikes, covert action, and other elements of national power." washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysi…
Crucial calculus from Eisenstadt:
An attack has to set back Iran's program, come with credible threat of follow-up attacks and covert action, *but* avoid a major Iranian escalation.
But it's clear that this is not (and cannot) be a one-off.
US has to credibly commit to a large-scale military operation, *and* a prolonged campaign of military and covert action, with a credible threat of targeting economic and leadership in the event Iran attempts to rebuild.
So a very rough breakdown of what happened with Syria.
1) Assad had been backing away from Iran for years, he talked to Israeli, he (maybe) leaked info on IRGC ops but also his regime had been deeply penetrated by Israeli intelligence. Tehran knew this and was mad about it.
2) So when Assad looked to be in trouble after Aleppo fell, Iran was (maybe) a little slower in helping him. Likely there was some haranguing behind the scenes: "so now you need us, do you?" etc.
This may have contributed to the lack of a response, Arraghchi's calm, etc.
3) When HTS began advancing south, there was an effort to hold the line at Hama. For a day or two, it was successful. Likely this was where Iran began contributing more troops--it was also where Assad was to show he still had fight in him.
Seeing a lot of skepticism re: this report, which @BarakRavid sources to multiple US and Israeli officials.
FWIW this confirms a chain of reporting from the US that goes back months, it explains why Taleghan-2 was hit in October (at the time, something of a mystery).
Up to individual analysts and observers to determine whether they think this is credible.
Personally, I don't find anything in the report hard to believe.
An uptick in dual-use research conducted at Parchin in secret makes sense, since 1) rhetoric tied to changing the nuclear doctrine has markedly increased this year, and 2) IRGC division tasked with the nuclear program is more independent than in the past.
It's unclear how much influence Vance will have inside a second Trump administration, but fwiw, the potential impact on foreign policy could be huge.
His opposition to Ukraine aid is known, but he's generally leery of a lot of conventional US foreign policy, including in MENA.
Vance is pro-Israel and an Iran hawk, but he's opposed US interventions and has been critical of the US presence in Syria while supporting Arab normalization efforts with Israel.
I didn't want it to come to this, but you all have left me no choice: rumors regarding a 50yr US-Saudi agreement "expiring," triggering the end of dollar dominance, are total nonsense.
A thread:
First: in the late 1960s, as a result of shifts in the int'l oil industry and improving negotiating position for major oil producers, states like Saudi started earning more per-barrel from their oil exports. The process accelerated in 1971 with the Tripoli/Tehran agreements.
The end of Bretton-Woods in 1971, collapse of the fixed exchange rate system regulating currency exchange, and the creeping threat of inflation in the Western economies coincided with a transfer of wealth from consumers to producers. "Petrodollars" were born.