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Gregory Brew

@gbrew24

Jun 22

The US has bombed Fordow. It has very likely used enough force to significantly damage, if not destroy, the enrichment facility.

We likely won't know for quite some time. It's possible we may never know, as that will be a big part of Iran's response. 1/

Iran is sure to respond to this attack. To do nothing would be a colossal blow to the regime's credibility. There will be a short-term response.

But the bigger response, the more significant one, is likely to play out on the nuclear file. 2/

Trump wants this to be the end. And perhaps it is--for him.

If the US dodges a large-scale escalation, Trump can claim to have destroyed Iran's nuclear program. He will claim a historic win. He'll end his term with this feather in his cap.

But the Iranians will rebuild. 3/

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Gregory Brew

@gbrew24

Jun 14

Iran and Israel are at war.

Israel has the upper hand. But its goal--eliminating the nuclear program--remains out of reach.

Iran, bloodied but defiant, will keep fighting. More barrages likely.

In this scenario, hard to see early resolution without intervention and mediation.

Destroying Fordow may become possible. But for now, Israel can't do it.

Equally challenging is destroying Iran's stockpiles of HEU.

Killing scientists sets Iran back, but doesn't destroy nuclear know-how. axios.com/2025/06/14/ira…

The longer the war continues, the closer Israel may get to its goals. But similarly, Iran may be pushed to undertake more escalatory action. Both risk dragging in the US--though a degree of US involvement is likely inevitable, especially in terms of Israel's defense.

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Gregory Brew

@gbrew24

Jun 12

Very important detail: US estimates Iran has 2k missiles carrying 2k+ lb warheads. Presumably many more of the smaller variety. This is larger than the quasi-official estimate of 3k total.

Despite last year's attack, Iran is producing missiles at a rate of *50 per month*

axios.com/2025/06/12/isr…

Important to note that Witkoff's estimates are larger numbers than what the US has cited before--and he suggests Israel's success at impeding Iranian missile development last year was not was thunderous as is generally thought.

Heightened risk to Israel from Iran retaliation.

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Gregory Brew

@gbrew24

Apr 4

Privately, DOD admits they have had limited success against the Houthis, despite strikes being larger than what was done under Biden, "and much bigger than what [DOD] has publicly described." Costs are $200 million so far and could exceed $1 billion by next week.

Deployments of B-2 bombers and additional assets have been connected to the US pressure campaign against Iran, but they also likely serve a role in freeing up more assets to use against the Houthis.

The campaign is big and getting bigger...though so far, with limited success.

Pushback suggests the admin sees additional stages in this campaign--perhaps more bombing (which would mean more munitions and more spending).

Note the private pushback did not include any mention of killing Houthi leaders, despite Gabbard and others claiming it publicly.

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Gregory Brew

@gbrew24

Mar 12

"A preventive attack likely won’t be a one-off but rather the opening round of a lengthy campaign employing military strikes, covert action, and other elements of national power." washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysi…

Crucial calculus from Eisenstadt:

An attack has to set back Iran's program, come with credible threat of follow-up attacks and covert action, *but* avoid a major Iranian escalation.

But it's clear that this is not (and cannot) be a one-off.

US has to credibly commit to a large-scale military operation, *and* a prolonged campaign of military and covert action, with a credible threat of targeting economic and leadership in the event Iran attempts to rebuild.

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Gregory Brew

@gbrew24

Dec 28, 2024

So a very rough breakdown of what happened with Syria.

1) Assad had been backing away from Iran for years, he talked to Israeli, he (maybe) leaked info on IRGC ops but also his regime had been deeply penetrated by Israeli intelligence. Tehran knew this and was mad about it.

2) So when Assad looked to be in trouble after Aleppo fell, Iran was (maybe) a little slower in helping him. Likely there was some haranguing behind the scenes: "so now you need us, do you?" etc.

This may have contributed to the lack of a response, Arraghchi's calm, etc.

3) When HTS began advancing south, there was an effort to hold the line at Hama. For a day or two, it was successful. Likely this was where Iran began contributing more troops--it was also where Assad was to show he still had fight in him.

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