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It’s finally happening: Douglass Mackey, who was convicted in a New York City courtroom of “election interference” for sharing a satirical anti-Hillary meme on Twitter nearly eight years ago, is fighting back against the injustice and filing an appeal. If you’re not familiar with this crucial First Amendment case, last year, Revolver published a detailed breakdown of the politically motivated sham charges against Douglass Mackey. We encourage you to read it and get up to speed on this significant case, which will have far-reaching implications you might not have even considered.

Most Important First Amendment Case You’ve Never Heard Of: Biden Regime Tries to Toss a Young Man in Jail for 10 Years for Anti-Hillary Memes

In addition, Mr. Mackey had a sit-down with Tucker Carlson to delve into his case shortly after he was convicted and sentenced to seven months behind bars for sharing a funny meme.

Mr. Mackey shared some very important details regarding his appeal in a Substack newsletter post:

On Friday, January 5th, my legal team and I officially filed my appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.

Douglass shared some crucial highlights from the brief that you will likely find very compelling.

  • The Government is trying to put Mackey in prison for tweeting two deceptive memes about how to vote, on the theory that any false speech that “hampers” voting violates the Enforcement Act of 1870. This is unprecedented, and lawless.
  • Consistent with its text and history, § 241 has never been employed to criminalize political misinformation, despite the practice’s ubiquity.
  • [T]he Government presses a reading of § 241 that would necessarily criminalize not only lies about how to vote, but also lies about also whether and for whom to vote. Such a sprawling political speech code is in the teeth of every applicable canon for reading criminal laws, and grossly offends the First Amendment.
  • The Government premised venue exclusively on the fact that internet data associated with Mackey’s tweets briefly crossed EDNY waters or airspace on its way to the broader internet. But this theory would allow for trial in any district that has internet. And a venue theory that is indifferent between Brooklyn, NY and Brooklyn, WI makes a hash of this core constitutional protection. Unsurprisingly, this Court has never upheld criminal venue on such a threadbare basis.
  • [T]he record failed to reveal any proof that Mackey coordinated his memes with others, or entered any agreement to violate federal law. At most, the Government adduced evidence suggesting that other Twitter trolls proximate to Mackey may have colluded with one another. Guilt by association may prove effective at trial, but is paradigmatically insufficient as a matter of law.
  • [P]rosecutors purported to find a ban on election misinformation in a 150-year-old statute to combat KKK violence.
  • Section 241 does not give the Government a roving license to criminalize political misinformation.
  • [T]he decision to prosecute deceptive speech is without precedent in § 241’s 150-year history, as the Government openly admitted at oral argument on the bond motion.
  • [T]he premise of this prosecution is that § 241 criminalizes anything, even deceptive speech, that may “hamper,” “frustrate,” “slow,” or “prevent” voting. […] Consider the repercussions of that interpretation[.]
  • If deceiving voters “injures” their right to vote, then any such deceit is a crime—and that interpretation is so overinclusive and so chilling that it would readily fail any form of heightened scrutiny under United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
  • A progressive activist’s Twitter posts did the same thing as Mackey’s, except she told Donald Trump supporters to vote by text. [,,,] Unlike Mackey, she was not prosecuted. That (not to mention the suspect timing of the indictment) at least suggests political bias, which reinforces why restricting speech in this context is especially fraught.
  • [O]nce § 241 is extended to deceptive speech, there is no way to stop it from erecting a “Ministry of Truth.” […] The Government’s reading of § 241 would invite prosecution for every hotly debated political rumor and conspiracy theory […] Extending § 241 to voter deception thus turns “the state” into “the arbiter of truth.”
  • [T]he Supreme Court has been clear that statutes facing First Amendment challenge cannot be artificially narrowed.
  • The Government secured Mackey’s conviction using not only an unprecedented interpretation of § 241. It also resorted to a novel and untenable theory of venue. […] Both the Constitution and the Federal Rules guarantee a defendant’s right to be tried in “the district where the crime was ‘committed.’” […] This is not a matter of “mere procedure.” […] The venue right was “highly prized by the founding generation,” […] which recognized that giving prosecutors “leeway” to handselect a “favorable” forum “leads to the appearance of abuses, if not to [actual] abuses.” […] To prevent “prosecutorial abuse” and its “appearance,” the Founders thus limited venue to the district “where the wrong was committed.”
  • [T]he Government prosecuted Mackey in EDNY. It maintained that venue was proper solely because internet data associated with Mackey’s tweets briefly flashed through EDNY en route to elsewhere. But such data passes through every district in the country, so treating that fleeting connection as establishing venue would license the Government to prosecute any internet-linked offense anywhere. The Constitution denies that “leeway.”
  • To ensure compliance with constitutional safeguards against “prosecutorial abuse, […] venue provisions “should not be so freely construed as to give the Government the choice of a tribunal favorable to it” […] “The founding generation had a deep and abiding antipathy to letting the government arbitrarily choose a venue in criminal prosecutions.”
  • [T]he “ever-increasing ubiquity of the Internet” amplifies the “‘danger’” that the Government will charge “cybercrimes” as if they occurred in “some metaphysical location” that “allow[s] the [G]overnment to choose its forum free from any external constraints” […] That is an impermissible and “outlandish outcome” that “cannot be squared with the Constitution.”
  • The district court identified no case holding that venue lies in every district traversed by data associated with nationally accessible internet posts—and, at oral argument on the bond motion, the Government conceded no such case exists. That itself is powerful evidence.
  • “Though our nation has changed in ways which it is difficult to imagine that the Framers … could have foreseen, the rights of criminal defendants which they sought to protect in the venue provisions of the Constitution are neither outdated nor outmoded.”
  • Prosecuting Mackey in EDNY on these facts “prejudiced” him and “undermined the fairness of [his] trial.” […] Given the meager nexus between this case and EDNY, selection of that forum (headquarters of the Clinton campaign) at minimum risked the “appearance” of manipulation.
  • Even if the Government’s § 241 theory and venue theory were legally viable, the evidence it introduced cannot sustain his conspiracy conviction. The trial evidence showed that Mackey found publicly available memes and posted them without anyone asking him to do so; there was no contrary evidence. The district court upheld the conviction anyway based on evidence suggesting that others […] may have conspired, but precedent forecloses such guilt-by-association analysis[.]
  • [T]here was no evidence that Mackey coordinated with anyone to create the memes, solicited them from anyone, or was asked by anyone to post them.
  • Mackey’s use of popular hashtags is not probative of any conspiratorial agreement with anyone.
  • The district court found the evidence sufficient, but its analysis was wrong at every turn. […] Mackey cannot be guilty of conspiracy unless he agreed to participate in unlawful conduct. […] Yet even the Government did not take the position that any of Mackey’s other Twitter trolling was criminal; nor did the district court suggest otherwise.
  • The district court’s claim that Mackey also participated in “discussing, creating and spreading deceptive information about how to vote” was not supported with any record citations. [T]he record shows the opposite.
  • Mackey’s work with the War Room “to spread their political messages” was textbook First Amendment speech […] Treating that conduct as evidence of criminal intent, as the court did, […] only exacerbates the offense to the First Amendment.

You can click here to download the entire brief.

Doug not only addressed his long-awaited appeal, but he also timed it to coincide with the anti-American movement to remove Trump from the ballot. Doug correctly points out that voters in Blue States, where Democrats are conspiring to interfere in the 2024 election and suppress voters, can and should file suit against the DOJ for infringing on their right to vote for the candidate of their choice.

Here’s what he said in a post on X:

Since the decision to kick Trump off the ballot involves state action, GOP voters in Maine and Colorado can file civilly under 18 USC 242, which contains a private right of action, under the DOJ theory that their right to vote for their candidate of choice is being impeded.

See my appeal:

“The right to vote includes the right to vote for one’s chosen candidate; that is why it violates § 241 for officials to change votes after they are cast, United States v. Thompson, No. 6:09–16, 2013 WL 5528827, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 4, 2013).”


“[T]he premise of this prosecution is that § 241 criminalizes anything, even deceptive speech, that may ‘hamper,’ ‘frustrate,’ ‘slow,’ or ‘prevent’ voting. […] Consider the repercussions of that interpretation[.]”


“The Government’s expansive interpretation of ‘injure’ would also sweep beyond speech, to cover any conduct that makes voting less convenient—or as the Government put it, anything ‘that makes the right to vote more difficult.’ ECF 97 at 11. Think about suits challenging voter-identification requirements or limits on early voting. The Supreme Court has been skeptical of those claims when framed as civil violations of the Voting Rights Act. E.g., Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321 (2021). On the theory adopted below, an ambitious prosecutor could charge state officials criminally for initiating those reforms to ‘hamper’ or ‘slow’ voting rights.”

This is an appeal that Doug can win, but he needs your help to do it. He can’t fight this war alone. Please consider donating to Doug’s legal defense so he can continue battling the Biden Regime for our First Amendment rights.

Donation Links:

Meme Defense Fund (tax-deductible) – click here

  • (Tax-deductible check or cash donations can be made out to “American Cause—Meme Defense—10321 Hunt Farm Ln—Oakton, VA 22124)

GiveSendGo – click here

Private, personal gift via cash, check or money order: Please make out to Douglass Mackey and send to: Douglass Mackey—PO Box 6332—Delray Beach, FL 33482


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You can subscribe to Doug’s Substack, where he posts regular updates on his case.

Follow Doug on his social media to keep up on his case, and other important first amendment and voter rights issues: