Evaluation of our sanctions policy 1. Only 2 questions matter. First, have our sanctions meaningfully curtailed Russia's ability to wage war? Second, are our sanctions a deterrent to countries that may wage war in the future? Unfortunately, the answer to both questions is: "No!"
2. Root problem is an infatuation with financial sanctions. These can be effective when used on current account deficit countries - Turkey in 2018 is an example - but they don't work on current account surplus countries. This is a key point that cannot be emphasized enough.
3. Russia shows how our financial sanctions failed. We sanctioned some banks, including the central bank (red), but not all. This meant that all the cash from Russia's current account surplus got routed through non-sanctioned Russian banks (blue). Putin still got all his cash...
4. So our financial sanctions did not prevent Putin getting all his cash in return for energy exports. All this cash just got routed through different banks than before. As a result, financial conditions in Russia eased back to pre-war levels, a big plus for Russia's war economy.
5. We could have avoided this, but it would have required sanctioning ALL Russian banks. That's the same as a trade embargo, since Putin no longer gets paid and stops exporting. This shows what's needed to hurt c/a surplus countries: a trade embargo! Not financial sanctions...
6. Number one lesson from Russia is that our infatuation with financial sanctions must end. They don't work on c/a surplus countries, unless we sanction all banks, in which case we're just doing a trade embargo. We need to be doing trade embargos instead of financial sanctions...
7. Had we done a hard energy embargo on Russia, this would have come at a cost to the West, but Russia would have gone into financial crisis, making the war harder for Putin to fight. An embargo would have also scared other potentially hostile current account surplus countries.
8. It's not too late. First, the West needs to end its focus on financial sanctions. Second, we need to start talking about hard trade-offs that are needed to confront c/a surplus countries. We need to stop giving them cash, which means we need to stop buying their stuff...
9. A footnote on the G7 oil price cap. The cap is recognition of the fact that Russia's current account surplus needs to be cut. But - thanks to Greek shipping oligarchs - the cap was set at $60 and wasn't binding. A mistake that can be fixed now by lowering the cap...
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Requiem for IMF/WB spring meetings 1. After SVB, everyone's more bearish, but NO ONE forecasts a US hard landing, hard to square with reality of credit cycles. Assume credit is flat into end-2023 (black). Credit impulse (blue) - which drives GDP growth - goes deeply negative...
2. So there's a kind of collective denial how credit cycles work. Assuming credit in % GDP is stable into end-2023 is arguably an optimistic assumption. Yet even in this positive scenario, the credit impulse almost guarantees a US hard landing. Odds of deep recession have risen.
3. This incoherence on SVB feeds into market pricing for the Fed. Markets price one more hike, then cuts in H2 2023, i.e. a bit of everything: SVB isn't a big deal, but then it maybe becomes a bigger deal. In the end, it's all "soft landing" stuff with risks to the downside...
You don't see it looking at $/TRY, but Turkish Lira is under big depreciation pressure. Only thing that stops this is to slow credit growth, which is running out-of-control. During the 2018 devaluation, the only thing that stabilized Lira was a credit crunch. It's the same now...
Much smarter people than me - including @ali_hakan_kara and @UgrasUlkuIIF - say I should deflate Turkey's nominal credit numbers to adjust for inflation. Not sure. Lira is quasi-pegged, so credit growth spills 1:1 into import demand. If you deflate, you miss that channel...
Turkey's current account deficit - on our core measure (blue) excluding energy (red) & gold (pink) - rose to an unprecedented -$6 bn in January 2023. That is one signal that deflating credit growth misses the big rise in external purchasing power, which $/TRY peg gives people...
The fear of inflation is back. Markets are buzzing about a 50 bps Fed hike in March. That's VERY unlikely and only 30 bps are priced. But it is possible markets force the Fed's hand in a replay of what happened last June when the Fed hiked 75 bps (after hiking 50 bps in May).
The hurdle to go back up to 50 bps hikes is high, because of a language change in the Feb. 1 statement that "locks" in 25 bps hikes: the statement switched to talking about the "extent" of future hike, replacing the word "pace." So 25 bps hikes for maybe longer, but not 50 bps...
But even if the Fed is "locked" into 25 bps hikes, markets can force the Fed's hand, which is what happened ahead of the June 15, 2022 meeting. A "hot" CPI report and a jump in longer-term University of Michigan inflation expectations caused break-even inflation (blue) to jump...
Is the European energy shock over? 1. The Euro (black) is back to pre-war levels and common measures for the Euro zone terms-of-trade - the ratio of export to import prices - have also risen lots (blue). Many are using this to claim the energy shock is over, but that's WRONG...
2. To start with, while gas prices in Europe have fallen from insane levels in Aug. '22, they're hugely above pre-COVID levels. Spot (black) and one-year ahead TTF gas prices (blue) are 260% above 2018-2019 averages. The hit to European - and German - competitiveness is HUGE!
3. How come gas prices fell?. Putin turning off Nordstream shifted the supply curve to the left from S to S'. Prices rose and consumption fell. The economy shifted away from gas to coal, moving demand from D to D'. Gas prices fell, but the hit to profits & demand is still there.
This week's BoJ meeting is wrongly portrayed as a binary choice: (i) keep yield curve control; or (ii) end yield curve control. This is the wrong way of looking at this. What is Governor Kuroda's ultimate objective? It is to exit YCC without the Yen strengthening massively...
The Yen has always been the key parameter for Kuroda. After all, it was the risk of $/JPY going below the critical 100 threshold that led to YCC in the first place back in September 2016. $/JPY is falling again sharply now, so it'd be very foolish to just ditch YCC. What to do?
Only way to avoid massive Yen appreciation is for BoJ to accept that it will need to buy JGBs in massive size as it ditches YCC. That will avoid yields spiking, which would drive the Yen much stronger. In fact, this is what BoJ has been doing since it lifted the yield cap in Dec.
Why no German recession? 1. We wrongly forecast recession in 2022. Kudos to @Isabel_Schnabel who's consistently been more positive and to @ben_moll who's done a great public service tracking the extent to which German industry has shifted away from Russian gas. What is going on?
2. German IP has been incredibly stable through Nov. 2022, falling only -0.5% from Nov. 2021. First off, a warning. German IP decoupled from GDP growth in 2019 when the auto sector went into recession but Germany did not. Some of the resilience now is a bounce-back from that...
3. You can see some of this auto bounce-back in the composition of German IP, with autos & chip-heavy sectors offsetting big drops in gas-intensive sectors. But even if this bounce-back in autos & chips had not occured, IP would only be down 4-5%. Nothing like a 2008 recession...